This note proposes a statistical perturbation scheme to protect a statistical database against compromise. The proposed scheme can handle the security of numerical as well as nonnumerical sensitive fields or a combination of fields. Furthermore, knowledge of some records in a database does not help to compromise unknown records. We use Chebyshev's inequality to analyze the trade-offs among the magnitude of the perturbations, the error incurred by statistical queries, and the size of the query set to which they apply. We show that if the statistician is given absolute error guarantees, then a compromise is possible, but the cost is made exponential in the size of the database.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of security in a statistical database involves three hypothetical individuals: the statistician, whose interest is to obtain aggregate data (means, medians, frequency) from the database; the owner of the data, who wishes to secure individual records; and the database administrator, who needs to satisfy both. The interested reader may consult [l-5, 8 , 91 for surveys of the problem and for further references.
One possible approach to a solution of the statistical database security problem is to restrict the size and overlap between the query sets1 available to the statistician. However, the major result of a series of papers is that "Compromise r A query set is a set of records whose aggregate statistics are subject to a query.
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In this note we study alternative solutions to the problem of securing statistical databases, on the basis of random perturbations of the database. We quantify and analyze the trade-offs between "security" of the database and precision of the data extracted through statistical queries, using Chebyshev's inequality.
Securing data through statistical perturbations has been considered previously; see, for example, [2, 5] . The idea is quite simple, numerical fields in the database are randomly perturbed; a statistical query provides an estimator of the required quantity. If a query set is sufficiently large, the law of large numbers causes the error in the query to be significantly less than the perturbations of individual records. The dangers involved in a statistical perturbation scheme are (1) that the database may be compromised if the statistician is allowed sufficiently many independent estimates; (2) the statistician is not guaranteed error bounds on query responses. L. Beck [l] has recently suggested a statistical perturbation scheme which parametrizes the variance of the perturbations. He demonstrates that a proper parametrization guarantees the database against a statistical compromise using linear queries. There are two limitations to this method: First, protection is only proved for restricted forms of attack (e.g., linear queries). Second, the statistician may only be provided with statistical error guarantees (i.e., bounds on the variance of the estimator used). It is possible that the result of any specific query grossly deviates from the actual value of the answer. The protection scheme proposed in this note overcomes the second problem, and can in general be applied to arbitrary queries. While we treat in detail only the case of linear queries, there is a discussion in Section 2.4 of how the scheme can be generalized to arbitrary queries.
To introduce the proposed scheme, consider, for example, a database containing employee data where one of the fields indicates salary. Let d = (dl, &, . . . , d,) describe the salary field of the n records in the database. Let C C (1, 2, . . . , n) be a query set and let ] C ] be the number of elements in C. A linear statistical query over C is the function:
The values of individual dis can be compromised in spite of query set size and overlap restrictions; see [3, 4] .
Let us assume that rather than storing the actual vector d in the database, a vector d' is stored, where e = d' -d is a random perturbation vector, whose components are independent random variables and whose mean is 0. Note that unlike the scheme proposed by Beck [l] , which allows the statistician to obtain an unlimited number of sample estimates to any given query, the perturbed data is fixed for the full database, and the perturbation is not changed from query to query.
The statistician may now make any query of his choice, and may even acquire the vector d'. However, by properly selecting the perturbation, knowledge of d' does not constitute a danger of compromising the actual records d. On the other hand, the statistics of d' may be used to provide a fairly accurate description of the statistics of d. Note again that since the perturbation is fixed, it is impossible for the statistician to improve the estimate of any given query result by repeating the query. Therefore, the concept of a statistical compromise in the sense of [l] , measuring the variance of the estimator of individual records, is not relevant here. The only estimator available for any given record is its perturbed value
To fix these ideas, assume that the perturbations ei are identically distributed with variance a2 and consider a linear query qc. Chebyshev's inequality yields Probllqdd') -q&UI =~lcll 5s. E
The left-hand side represents the probability that the error in the query exceeds some bound. The right-hand side bounds this probability in terms of the variance of individual perturbations, the error bound sought, and the size of the query set. The statistician would like to keep the probability of large errors in the result of a query small, while the database owner would like to keep the perturbations (i.e., a) in individual records large so as to protect them. The database administrator can choose u to satisfy both.
To illustrate this solution, let us consider a numerical example. Suppose the average salary in the database is $20,000, and the database owner would like the standard deviation to be at least 20 percent of this average. The statistician, on the other hand, would like the error in queries not to exceed $1000. The database administrator can set u = 4000 and c = 1000, and thus guarantee the statistician that the error ] q&d') -q,(d) ] / ] C ] exceeds $1000 with probability smaller than 16/ ] C I. Therefore, the database owner can be fully satisfied that individual records are adequately perturbed; while the statistician% queries are answered within the required accuracy, with a probability that depends on the size of the query sets. The larger the query set, the smaller the probability of error.
Put another way, the error bounds agreeable to the statistician, 6, and the probability, 1 -6, that this error bound holds, depend on the size of the query set ] C ] and the standard deviation of the perturbation (as determined by the desires of the database owner) through the formula:
Once the database administrator determines the right-hand side, the tradeoffs among query size, error bound, and error probability are given by the lefthand side. This inequality introduces an uncertainty principle among the errors in queries, the probability of errors, and the size of the query sets. Also note that the magnitude of the perturbations in individual records, measured by u, may be substantially larger than the magnitude of the error in the queries. The statistician takes advantage of the law of large numbers to increase the precision of the results of queries by applying queries to large query sets.
The above idea generalizes to an arbitrary numerical field d in a trivial manner.
VARIATIONS ON THE BASIC IDEA
A number of objections might be raised to the above protection scheme. We list four of them, and show how our basic protection scheme might be modified to meet these objections.
(1) A first objection might be that the error guarantees provided to the statistician are probabilistic. Given a perturbed database d', a query q&d') may result in a large error relative 'to qc(d). This may happen even when the query set C is very large. Chebyshev's inequality provides an assurance that such an error is not likely for a given query set and a random perturbation. However, once d' is selected, a large error is clearly possible for some queries.
If the statistician is not content to live with occasional large errors, there is a variation of the scheme, described below, which will permit the database to be statistically compromised, but at high cost. We give an example for which we show that, for this variant, compromise is exponentially (in the database size) difficult. We believe that the assumptions of the example (see (i)-(iii), below) are nonrestrictive and that therefore the conclusion that compromise is feasible but exponentially difficult holds generally. The analysis of the general case has not been carried out, since it would be difficult to do and would not yield new insights.
The variant is to monitor the error in the query 1 qc(d') -qc(d) 1 and to check whether it exceeds the error bound requested by the statistician. If the error bounds are exceeded and if the size of the query set 1 C I exceeds a certain threshold size no, set by the database administrator, then a correction mechanism is invoked. The correction mechanism simply perturbs qc(d) by adding some random variable (with O-mean and uf-variance) until adequate error bounds are met. That is, we add per(C) to qc(d) where I per(C) I does not exceed the error bound requested by the statistician.
While this scheme may keep the statistician happy, the database is no longer secure (in a statistical sense). An attack on the database would first identify query sets C, of size greater than no, that result in an excessive error and thus cause the correction mechanism to be invoked. We call such sets compromising sets. Once compromising sets are identified, a statistical compromise of the database is easy.
We illustrate this by a simple example. Suppose that the database is perturbed such that d' = d + e where e = (el, . . . , e,). For simplicity, we assume (i) ei = + 1, and + and -are equiprobable; (ii) n is even, n = 2p, and the number of + and -is p; (iii) every query is equiprobable.
Then, the average query set length is 2-" i k(Z) =;. We now derive the complexity of identifying a compromising set for the example presented above. For simplicity, we set the threshold size n,, = 0 and t E (0, 1). We first evaluate the number n, of query sets for which the absolute error is s, that is, From this we conclude that the probability of the query sets for which the correction mechanism is invoked satisfies the inequality
Thus, it decreases exponentially to zero with n. This proves that almost all queries are answered within the acceptable error bound, and the correction mechanism is invoked extremely rarely.
How hard is it to find a compromising set? More precisely, what is the minimal member of queries to find a compromising set with probability 1 -6? If we have k queries, k << 2", the probability that all of them are answered within the acceptable error bound is approximately at least (1 -2q (e)")k. Thus 1 -(1 -2q(c)")k is an upper bound on the probability of finding a compromising set. Hence, k satisfies the inequality
This proves that one has to have an exponential number of queries to find a compromising set, and makes compromising the database infeasible.
(2) A second objection that might be raised to the proposed statistical security scheme is that the perturbed vector d' requires additional storage. This is easily circumvented by perturbing the elements of d every time they are accessed. To guarantee that a given query always receives the same answer, the perturbation of di may be obtained using a pseudorandom generator with a fixed seed which is given by some function of i. Therefore, one has a choice of either storing the perturbed values or computing them every time they are needed.
(3) A third objection might be that the perturbations of individual records should not be identically distributed. For instance, in the above salaries example, a $4000 perturbation may be suitable to hide information about salaries that do not exceed the average salary ($20,000) too far. However, if one of the salaries is $175,000, a perturbation of $4000 does not adequately protect the respective record. The discussion above assumes that a record is compromised only if its real value becomes available to the statistician. This example suggests that an alternative notion of compromisability is required. Given a constant c, let us define a perturbation scheme to be noncompromisable with respect to c if c di < a(~) for all records. That is, if the standard deviation of each perturbation exceeds a given fraction (c) of the magnitude of the respective item.
This problem may be solved using a multiplicative rather than an additive perturbation. That is, the perturbed record dl is generated by selecting a random factor ci and multiplying by dim The perturbations caused by this process are given by ei = d( -di = di(ci -l), and are thus proportional to the value of die Let A indicate the diagonal matrix formed from the multipliers ci. The perturbed data is related to the original data through d' = Ad. If the random variables Qi -1 are independent and identically distributed with zero mean and variance a', then the perturbation elements ei are independent, have zero mean and a variance dza', respectively. Clearly, the scheme is noncompromisable (in the sense defined above) with respect to any constant that does not exceed u. Furthermore, Chebyshev's inequality may be applied to obtain
where d denotes the maximal element among the di. The trade-off analysis performed in the previous section trivially generalizes for this multiplicative perturbation scheme. One may generalize this last scheme to allow perturbations by arbitrary random matrices. It has been shown by Warner [lo] that this general "regression" perturbation of data might be applied to perturb nonnumerical statistical data, as well as combinations of sensitive fields in the database. A detailed discussion of perturbation through matrix multiplication is beyond the scope of this paper; such details are available in [lo]. Again, the trade-off analysis easily generalizes to the case of arbitrary random matrix perturbation.
(4) A fourth objection might be that the above perturbation scheme only applies to linear queries. This objection is valid, since some queries (e.g., what is the maximal salary?) cannot benefit from the effects of the law of large numbers when one uses a statistical perturbation scheme. From a security point of view, the perturbation schemes discussed above offer no risk when it comes to an arbitrary query: The statistician may acquire a complete knowledge of the perturbed values d' without compromising the real data. However, the statistician may be unhappy with the answers if they deviate grossly from the real value. A possible solution is to generalize the process used to answer the first objection. Given an arbitrary query, define its query set as the set of records that are essential to the answer (a record is essential to a query if its omission from the database will change the answer). The modified mechanism to handle arbitrary queries is invoked only when the size of the respective query set exceeds some preset threshold. It proceeds by computing both the answer to the query based upon the perturbed data and an answer based upon the real data. If the two answers deviate by more than E ] C 1, where t is the error guarantee provided and C is the respective query set, then a new perturbation of the real answer is sampled until the error bounds are met. An arbitrary query may be represented as a function Q(d) applied to the database. If the function Q satifies the inequality ] Q(d) -Q(d') 1 I K ] 1 ei 1, where K is a constant, then it is straightforward to generalize the results of (2) to prove that compromise is exponentially hard. If, however, Q does not satisfy the inequality mentioned above, the problem of how to guarantee that compromise is exponentially hard is open,
